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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
TORTS -RECOVERY

FOR DEATH FROM FRIGHT

WITHOUT IMPACT
A trusty working on a prison farm escaped due to the negligence of the guards, and forced decedent to drive him to a
neighboring city. Decedent suffered from diabetes and hypertension, and died within twenty-four hours of a subarachnoid
hemorrhage induced by fright. In a suit by the executor against
the state for conscious pain and suffering and wrongful death,
Held: recovery allowed. Williams v. State, 204 Misc. 843, 126
N. Y. S. 2d 324 (Ct. C1. 1953), aff'd per curiam 284 App. Div. 1027,
134 N. Y. S. 2d 857 (4th Dep't 1954). The trial court found that
the conduct of the prisoner was both wanton and intentional, and
that there was no impact.
The impact doctrine holds that there may be no recovery for
negligently caused mental distress in the absence of a physical
touching. In New York this was first adopted in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896), in which
a runaway horse-drawn street car was stopped without having
touched the plaintiff, though so close to her that she stood between
the heads of the horses. Since there was no "impact", recovery
for subsequent injuries brought about by her fright was not
allowed.
This holding was adopted in many other states, and rejected
by still more (for a list of majority, minority and uncommitted
jurisdictions see McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in
New York, 26 ST. Jo2'Is L. RE.v. 1, 14 n. 40, 16 n. 43 (1949). All
states which contain cities of over a million in population, except
for California, have retained this requirement, SmiTn & PRossR,

Cases on Torts 523 (1st ed. 1952). Legal scholars seem to be
unanimously of the opinion that the doctrine has outlived whatever usefulness it might have had, Throckmorton, Damages for
Fright, 34 Hnv. L. REv. 260 (1921); Smith, Relation of Emotions
to Injury and Disease, 30 VA. L. RFv. 193 (1944), and the trend
is clearly away from requiring this element. It has been riddled
with exceptions, notably in the telegraph, Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930), burial, Klumbach v.
Silver Mount Cemetery Ass'n, 242 App. Div. 843, 275 N. Y. Supp.
180 (2d Dep't 1934), and food cases, Carroll v. New York Pie
Baking Co., 215 App. Div. 240, 213 N. Y. Supp. 553 (2d Dep't 1926),
see Wilson, The New York Rule as to Nervous Shock, 11 CouRBm
L. Q. 512, 516-518 (1926); for other exceptions see 1936 LAw RE.visioiq Comm. 375, 423 et seq., and the quantum of impact necessary
to sustain the burden of a parasitic tort has become increasingly
slight, Smith, op. cit. supra at 792, n. 79. Since the doctrine con-
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cerns only cases of negligence, it is inapplicable when the conduct
complained of is wanton or intentional, Beck v. Libraro, 220 App.
Div. 547, 221 N. Y. Supp. 737 (2d Dep't 1927).
In New York the Mitchell case was qualified in Comstock v.
Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931), in which the defendant's car collided with that of decedent, who got out of her car,
fainted and fell. The court found sufficient impact in the collision
of the cars, which in itself caused no injury to decedent but which
the court viewed as a concurrent cause of the injury. Cases of
this sort are to be distinguished from those involving attempted
escape from negligently caused peril, Twomley v. Central Park.
N. & E. B. B. Co., 69 N.Y. 158 (1877), and those which involve
negligent conduct apart from that which caused the fright, Cohin
v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39 (1st
Dep't 1914), where the injuries complained of are not directly
induced by the fright (but see PRossFR, ToRTs 218, n. 84 (1st ed.
1941), although an element of fear is present somewhere in the
chain of causation; the impact rule has no application in such
cases. For a concise discussion of the general area, see James,
Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 778, 789796 (1953), esp. 790 n. 64 for bibliography. In addition to the case
law on impact, in 1936 the Law Revision Commission suggested
a statute, op. cit. supra at 377, to abolish the impact rule, but
the bill was rejected.
Concerning the question of causation, the lower court in the
instant case found no negligence in making the prisoner a trusty,
but only in guarding him. In escape cases questions of proximate
cause and forseeability depend upon the facts of the individual
cases. Where a moron who had a history of "eloping" and was
supposed to be kept under surveillance escaped from a state institution with a box of matches which by institution rules were
supposed to be kept under lock and key, and to keep warm lit a
fire which accidentally burned down a barn, Held: not forseeable,
although he was thinly clad and the temperature was below zero.
Excelsior Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. State, 296 N. Y. 40, 69 N. E. 2d 553
(1946). In a home for juvenile delinquents, where it was known
to the authorities that two boys were on bad terms and one of
them took the bottle of acid from a fire extinguisher and poured
it on the other while he was asleep, Held: not forseeable, Flaherty
v. State, 296 N. Y. 342, 73 N. E. 2d 543 (1947). But where two
men in an insane asylum were known to be enemies, and one
escaped from his restraining sheet and blinded the other, Held:
forseeable; insane victim allowed to recover. Scolavino v. State,
187 Misc. 253, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 17, modified 271 App. Div. 618, 67
N. Y. S. 2d 202, aff'd 297 N. Y. 460, 74 N. E. 2d 174 (1947).
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The trial court in the instant case distinguished the first two
cases, but even if the distinctions are accepted the impact rule
is still to be reckoned with. As was said in Comstock v. Wilson,
supra, "Serious consequences from mere mental disturbance unaccompanied by physical shock cannot be anticipated . . .". Because this suit was against the state, it would seem that recovery
would have to be predicated upon negligence rather than wantonness, though the decision was apparently based on imputing the
wantonness of the prisoner to the state. There seems to be no
precedent for this device; analogy with the line of cases involving
the escape of dangerous instrumentalities appears to be farther
from the point than the Agency cases in which wanton conduct
removes the actor from the scope of his employment, or where
such activity is regarded as an independent intervening cause, a
point which was argued in Flaherty v. State, supra, though not
discussed by the court. Thus, though the decision in this case
may be hailed as realistic, it appears to be erroneously grounded
and incompatible with the prior decisions in this state.
John P. MacArthur

